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The dog and the parakeet: Lacan among the animals 
 
 
Abstract 
This article explores the place of the animal and animals in Lacanian 
psychoanalysis, arguing that the standard accounts of Lacan on the animal, 
including the influential intervention by Derrida, depend almost exclusively on 
the Écrits and Lacan’s early seminars, overlooking late Lacanian texts and 
seminars. It starts by examining perplexing instances in Lacan’s seminar of 
‘silliness’ or ‘stupidity’ – what he himself calls bêtises. The bêtise, which Lacan 
says plays a critical role in clinical practice, is then treated as the way into a 
discussion of how the figure of the animal functions in Lacan’s seminar, and how 
it changes between early and late seminars, especially in terms of Lacan’s 
reliance on ethology. It shows how the early work rests heavily on key figures 
such as Konrad Lorenz and Niko Tinbergen, who disappear entirely from the late 
Lacan. Part of this reading is dedicated to a reassessment of Derrida’s account of 
the animal in Lacan, an account which is often taken to be the final word on the 
subject. 
 
 
 
 
 
What is the animal for Lacan?  At one time the question would hardly have 
occurred to anyone. And even though the question is now routinely addressed to 
the central figures of the theoretical tradition (see Badmington, Calarco), it is still 
rarely asked of Lacan.1 It is an odd omission, for as Michael Ziser, one notable 
exception to the rule, points out in his careful examination of Lacan’s 
‘discontinuism’ (16), Lacanian psychoanalysis is ‘historically and logically 
dependent on a large body of zoological research and animal engagement’ (12). 
Perhaps the question is so rarely asked because an answer is always ready to 
hand.  On the rare occasions when his name comes up in discussions of the post-
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human and animality, Lacan is more often than not spoken for by Jacques 
Derrida. 
In The Animal that Therefore I Am Derrida devotes an entire chapter, 
some twenty pages, to Lacan on animals, decisively placing the psychoanalyst 
within the tradition of Descartes, Levinas, Heidegger. For many, as a 
consequence, the matter is closed. Cary Wolfe, for example, comparing Lacan 
with Daniel Dennett, notes the former’s ‘strategy (…) to juridically separate the 
human from the animal as that being, alone among the living, who can lie by 
telling the truth’ (39). Having just quoted Dennett, Wolfe goes on that ‘here the 
distance between Dennett’s discourse and Lacan’s will become absolutely 
minimal’ (39). And to confirm this similarity of discourses, he quotes not Lacan … 
but Derrida. Given the highly distinctive nature of Lacan’s discourse, this is a 
surprising way of making the comparison. It is just one example of the way in 
which knowledge of Lacan on this subject is given in advance, but there are 
others.2 While it is true that in The Animal that Therefore I Am Derrida carefully 
identifies in Lacan’s work a range of structuring biases against animals and 
animality, and does of course cite Lacan, and in detail, this does not relieve us 
from also doing so if we are going to ask what the animal is for him. 
 
Bétises of burden 
In the opening essay to The Cambridge Companion to Lacan, Jean-Michel Rabaté 
tells of his first encounter with Lacan’s seminar in 1968. Coming into the lecture 
theatre late, the first words he heard from Lacan were a complicated series of 
puns about mustard and mustard pots. To Rabaté, Lacan looked like ‘an aging 
performance artist (…) whose very garb had something of the cabaret 
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comedian’s outfit’ (2), and although the elaborate word-play on mustard was 
clearly absurd, even hilarious, ‘no one laughed or even smiled’ in the room, with 
the exception of Lacan himself. For the reader of the transcribed seminars, 
divorced from the original context of the utterance, and therefore without the 
clues about mode of delivery and reception enjoyed by Rabaté, such 
bemusement is felt doubly. One can’t help suspecting that this whole Lacanian 
exercise is rather more fun than it is reputed to be, but how, exactly, are we to 
know when or whether the speaker is having a laugh? 
To take two examples, from Seminar XVII: The Other Side of Psychoanalysis, 
and Seminar XX: Encore — 
 
1. In the session of June 10, 1970, Lacan breaks away from an extended gloss 
on a single sentence in Freud’s ‘Analysis Terminable and Interminable’ to 
speak at length about ‘a somewhat neglected aspect’ of the domestic dog, 
which, it seems, cannot resist rotting flesh (carrion – charogne). This carrion, 
Lacan tells us, is equivalent to S1, the master signifier, and furthermore, 
‘speech can very easily play the role of carrion’ (The Other Side 167). Before 
finishing this he puns on how unappetizing speech as carrion is, calling it not 
very ragoûtante. Charogne itself contains another pun, a cat (chat) concealed 
in the first syllable, which explains the dog’s passion for carrion, but also its 
poor flavour.3 
 
2. Lacan spends the session of November 21, 1972, the opening one of the 
year, circling around a main thesis of Encore – that there is no sexual relation. 
Halfway in, just after introducing the neologism ‘l’amur’ and reflecting briefly 
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on Frege, he announces ‘I can tell you a little tale, that of a parakeet that was 
in love with Picasso’ (Encore 6). The parakeet, it seems, nibbled away 
amorously at Picasso’s shirt, not in order to get past the clothing to the man 
beneath, but precisely because the bird was in love with what came between 
it and the painter. In this, Lacan tells us, the parakeet was just like Descartes, 
for whom ‘men were merely clothes (…) walking about’ (des hommes, c’ était 
des habits en (…) pro-ménade) (Le séminaire: Encore 12). Again, there is some 
punning from Lacan, who breaks up promenade (a stroll) to suggest, as the 
translator’s note tells us, prometter la ménade (promising debauchery). And 
the word echoes, resonates, when later in the same year he expresses a wish 
to stroll among his audience: ‘je désirais vous parler en me promenant un 
petit peu entre vous.’ (61) In a seminar where movements of all sorts 
(including the MLF) play a paramount role, this wish is not insignificant, but 
as for the parakeet, whether parable or joke, it makes no further appearance 
in his speech. 
 
Although Rabaté is willing to call attention to the apparent silliness of Lacan, 
none of the essays in his Cambridge Companion to Lacan enlighten us on the dog 
or the parakeet. But then, nor do the two English-language volumes dedicated to 
Seminars XVII and XX have anything to say about these two psychoanalytic pets 
(Clemens and Grigg; Barnard and Fink). This silence extends to the indexes of the 
English translations of the seminars in question (the original French editions 
have no indexes). While one might not expect a single entry for ‘parakeet’, 
Picasso does not appear in the index to Encore either, as if this reference to him 
is neither here nor there, but certainly not in any sense genuine. The absence of 
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‘carrion’ from the index to The Other Side seems a more serious omission, since 
the concept resurfaces later in the seminar in Lacan’s articulation of the 
psychoanalyst’s (non)relation to knowledge (186). 
It is tempting to read as symptomatic the critical silence on the issue of the 
dog and the parakeet, and their indexical exclusion. These lacanimals are passed 
over because commentators are oriented almost uniformly towards that which 
in Lacan is transmissible, that which he made available for reiteration, which is 
to say his frequently repeated sayings or formulae (‘desire is the desire of the 
other’, ‘there is no sexual relation’, ‘a signifier represents a subject for another 
signifier’, ‘the subject is the one who speaks’), as well as his graphs and 
assemblages of mathemes (such as the four discourses of The Other Side, the 
graph of sexuation of Encore).4 By comparison, the baroque eccentricities of 
Lacan’s spoken style – the profuse silliness punctuating the transmittable 
pronouncements – radically resist transmission. There is no shortage of 
commentators to skillfully explicate the graph of desire or the four discourses,5 
but you will search long and hard to find one who does not studiously ignore the 
dog and the parakeet. 
To ignore the silliness is to smooth over the irregular contours of the 
Lacanian seminar. For what do the dog and the parakeet introduce into Lacan’s 
argument, regardless of whatever conceptual content they contain (which 
cannot be negligible either), if not incongruity and discontinuity? The tale of the 
parakeet and the lesson of the dog with its carrion are tiny contusions or 
eruptions. For the textualist these bizarre deviations in the fabric cannot be 
ignored. Psychoanalysis, after all, teaches us to pay attention to precisely those 
uttered elements that might otherwise be considered pointless remainders – 
 7 
nonsense or rubbish without meaning. And as Lacan himself says in Seminar XI, 
‘Discontinuity (…) is the essential form in which the unconscious first appears to 
us as a phenomenon’ (Four Fundamental Concepts 25). 
In fact, in calling these incidences of discontinuity in Lacan’s own speech 
‘silliness’ I have drawn on a key Lacanian term from Encore, although I have 
given it a different translation from the one given by Bruce Fink, who renders la 
bêtise as ‘stupidity’.6 Either translation is acceptable, but in both, the bête, the 
beast or animal of la bêtise is lost. The closest one might come to retaining this 
element of la bêtise is to translate it as ‘horse-play’, or perhaps ‘monkey 
business’. In The Lacanian Subject Fink also suggests ‘funny business’, arguing 
that la bêtise ‘is a piece of nonsense produced by the analytic process itself’ 
(135). Lacan claims that whereas all other ‘discourses’ avoid at all costs 
stupidity/silliness (dans les autres discours la bêtise c’est ce qu’on fuit [Le 
séminaire: Encore 18]), analytic discourse ‘hangs together by basing itself on the 
dimension of stupidity’ (Encore 12) (ce discours ne se tient-il pas de se supporter 
de la dimension de la bêtise?). 
By citing the importance of la bêtise, Lacan is in the first instance referring 
to the centrality of free association to the analytic situation – the way in which 
the analysand is encouraged to say whatever comes into her or his mind, 
regardless of how irrelevant it might seem. He often reminds his seminar that 
the goal in psychoanalysis is not to ‘say all’ (tout dire), but ‘dire n’importe quoi, 
sans hésiter à dire des bêtises’ (Le séminaire: Encore 29) – to ‘say anything, 
without worrying about saying anything stupid.’ (Encore 27) This is because ‘It 
speaks’ more powerfully, immediately, in la bêtise than it does in all those things 
we ‘mean’ to say. But Lacan is clearly also alert to the figure of animality 
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contained in la bêtise when he suggests that it is what other discourses ‘flee’ from 
(fuit) and when he says that it must be fed, nourished: ‘Il faut pourtant nourrir la 
bêtise.’ (Le séminaire: Encore 19) And when he talks of analytic discourse as ‘se 
supporter de la dimension de la bêtise’, he invokes a term – the ‘support’ – that 
echoes throughout his writings and his seminar. The mirror is described as a 
support, but so is his audience at the seminar, with the connotation of ‘prop’ at 
the forefront, but also of course, in the reflexive sense of the French verb 
‘supporter’, to tolerate, or put up with. A support, in Lacanian terms, both bears 
our burden and is a burden for us to bear. 
Another key ‘support’ from Seminar XVII onwards is his formalized 
depiction of discourse, the arrangement of the mathemes, barred S, a, S1, and S2, 
which when rotated, produce four discourses: the master’s, the hysteric’s, the 
university discourse and the analytic discourse. Throughout Seminars XVII and 
XX Lacan refers to this assemblage as a ‘quadripode’ (eg, Le séminaire: Encore 
85) or as having four paws or feet, ‘quatre pattes’ (eg, The Other Side 20), 
admitting implicitly to the work that the animal does in his thought, either 
carrying it along, or perhaps running off unbidden in pursuit of cha(t)rogne. The 
phrase ‘quatre pattes’ must also be considered an allusion to that other hard-
working although mythical beast, the Sphinx, whose riddle of four feet, two feet 
and three feet provides such support to the Oedipal tale. In these relatively late 
seminars, then, the ‘animal’ is a nonsensical intrusion in Lacan’s spoken 
discourse, a puzzling obstacle to understanding an already opaque discourse. At 
the same time, as bêtise, it is absolutely integral to psychoanalytical processes, 
difficult though it is to anticipate what form the bêtise will take. 
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Imaginary animals 
What is the figure of the animal for Lacan then? We know Derrida’s answer to 
this question. Based mainly on a reading of ‘The Subversion of the Subject and 
the Dialectic of Desire’ (1960), Derrida shows that Lacan sits firmly within ‘the 
Cartesian tradition of the animal-machine without language and without 
response’ (119). In common with Kant, Heidegger, and Levinas, Lacan is found 
by Derrida to invoke the concept of ‘the animal’ in general, and to deny to 
animals that which is taken to be properly human. More specifically, Lacan 
refuses the animal access to language, speech, the signifier, which disbars it in 
turn from desire, the law, the unconscious. In what Derrida calls ‘a limited but 
incontestable advance’ (122), Lacan grants to the animal a specular function, 
which is to say, a relation to its semblable, or mirror-image. But this progress in 
admitting the animal to the imaginary realm is simultaneously undone by Lacan, 
who, in Derrida’s words, ‘depriv[es] it of any access to the symbolic’ (120). The 
animal in Lacan is therefore subject to a certain ‘fixity’ (122-3) whereby it is held 
‘in captivity within the imaginary’ (121). Or as Bruce Fink puts it, for Lacan, ‘the 
imaginary dimension is the one that reigns supreme in the animal kingdom’ (Lacan 
on Love 65). 
It is difficult to disagree with Derrida. He concentrates on the writings 
assembled in Écrits, but we could just as easily cite from the seminars that were 
the original crucible for that text. In those early seminars, Lacan speaks 
frequently of animals, or even ‘the animal’, and takes up a fairly consistent and 
coherent position about them. For example, in 1954, in Seminar I: Freud’s Papers 
on Technique he declares: 
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You have only to observe a pet to see that a being deprived of language is 
quite capable of making calls on you, calls to draw your attention to 
something which, in some sense or other, it lacks. To the human call a 
further, richer development is reserved, because it takes place precisely in 
a being who has already reached the level of language. (84) 
The animal, although capable of makings calls, that is, articulating a demand, is 
nevertheless ‘deprived’ in relation to the human, whose access to language 
makes its call ‘richer’. That richness, unavailable to the animal ‘stuck within a 
number of imaginary conditions’ (146) is of course also a curse. The animal is 
subject to various ‘releasing mechanisms’ (121) which function more or less 
adequately, but for man, subjected to symbolization, ‘an eminent disorder 
characterizes the manifestation of the sexual function. Nothing in it adapts.’ 
(138) In order to press forward with the fundamental Freudian discovery about 
the instability, the disorder at the heart of sexual identity, Lacan feels it 
necessary to imagine a relative stability in the animal realm. As Michael Ziser 
puts it, Lacanian psychoanalysis, ‘with its anthropolinguistic assumptions about 
subject-formation and its operation in language, is necessarily and revealingly 
blind’ to ‘the challenging otherness of animal language’ (14). That blindness was 
in evidence the previous year in Lacan’s Rome Discourse, in which he contrasted 
the ‘diversity of human languages’ with the ‘fixity of the coding used by bees.’ 
(1977 84). Lacan draws on the work of Karl von Frisch on the ‘waggle dance’, 
and claims that von Frisch found in the bees’ dance a ‘code, or a system of 
signalling’, but not language per se. But von Frisch did in fact bestow on the 
dance the status of language, calling it a Tanzsprache, a conclusion that has been 
recently confirmed in Nature (Riley et. al.). Lacan and von Frisch no doubt had 
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very different underlying theories of what constituted language, but what 
interests Derrida most when he examines the Rome Discourse is Lacan’s 
insistent and jealous protection of language.7 
Later, in 1955 in Seminar III: The Psychoses, the dividing line between 
human and animal remains strictly drawn in terms of participation in imaginary 
and symbolic: 
the imaginary is surely the guide to life for the whole animal domain.  
While the image equally plays a capital role in our own domain, this role is 
completely taken up and caught up within, remolded and reanimated by, 
the symbolic order. (9) 
Two completely separate ‘domains’, then, one characterized by libidinal 
dynamism, the other, the animal, by a sort of pre-programming. Here again, as 
Derrida notes, Lacan only allows to the animal ‘the fixity of coding’ (122). Again, 
in Seminar III Lacan defines the human ‘subject’ in relation to its desire in 
contrast to the inhabitant of the ‘animal kingdom’ which has pre-determined 
‘rails’ along which it runs: 
The subject does not have to find the object of his desire, he is not led, 
channeled there, by the natural rails of a more or less pre-established 
instinctual and, moreover, more or less stumbling, adaptation, such as we 
see in the animal kingdom. (85) 
Against the received wisdom that Lacan marks a radical departure from the 
Cartesian subject, Derrida sees him as a direct inheritor of Descartes. In passages 
like the above, it is indeed difficult to see the difference between the Lacan of the 
early seminars and the Descartes who argued in Discourse on Method that 
animals ‘do not have a mind’, but that ‘nature (…) acts in them according to the 
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disposition of their organs, as one sees that a clock, which is made up only of 
wheels and springs, can count the hours and measure time’ (76-7). At the very 
point where he is attempting to break a new path in understanding the human 
subject, Lacan is reproducing, as Derrida says, an ‘old, old discourse’ (123) on the 
animal.  In this reading Lacan’s laborious decentering of the human subject, his 
constant project of inflicting wounds to human narcissism, is nevertheless 
dependent on an anthropocentric privileging of the human over the animal. 
But the situation is more complicated. The key word for Derrida is 
‘incapable’, which he uses seven times within the space of three pages (127-9). 
For Lacan, Derrida tells us, the animal is incapable of witnessing, incapable of the 
signifier, incapable (echoing Heidegger) of an authentic relation to death. 
Unusually for Derrida, for whom the exact text matters so much, the word is not 
actually found in Lacan, or at least Derrida nowhere cites Lacan calling the 
animal ‘incapable’, in spite of the insistence of the term in his own account.  
According to Derrida, one of the things Lacan (along with Descartes, Kant, 
Heidegger, Levinas) considers animals incapable of is the return of the human 
gaze. The animal for Lacan, and the rest, is ‘seen and not seeing’ (une chose vue et 
non voyante) and ‘the experience of the seeing animal, of the animal that looks at 
them (de l’animal qui les regarde), has not been taken into account’ (14). The 
equivocation of ‘regarde’ is important here, since it means in French not only ‘to 
look’, but in the reflexive case it means ‘has to do with you’, or ‘concerns you’. So 
when Derrida concludes in relation to these philosophers that ‘cela leur 
regardait’ he means that they are denying not only that the animal is looking at 
them, but that it is any of their business. And yet, this is not exactly right.  The 
human animal in Lacan does not own the gaze, and is always more seen than 
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seeing: dissected by the field of vision rather than possessor of a dissecting gaze.  
This is why when Lacan introduces the gaze in Seminar X: Angoisse, he says 
precisely, ‘ça me regarde’, with the same equivocation intended by Derrida when 
he uses the verb (293). Indeed, Seminar X, replete with animal and insect life, 
includes a striking opening apologue in which Lacan imagines himself faced with 
a giant praying mantis whose gaze he cannot interpret, but which concerns him 
intensely. Not only can he not look the creature in the eye, but he does not know 
what it sees when it looks at him (14).8 
Along similar lines Derrida finds in Lacan a claim for a human ‘possession 
of power’ over or in language, as well as ‘mastery’ in the ability to ‘pretend to 
pretend’ which comes as a surprise to any reader of Lacan accustomed to finding 
him precisely denying such things to the speaking subject. Indeed, Lacan’s 
account of the mirror-stage can hardly be described as proposing ‘the superiority 
of man over animot’ (130) as Derrida puts it. After all, that very first lacanimal, 
the chimpanzee of the mirror-stage, is in fact not captive to the image, quickly 
recognizing its emptiness (l’inanité de l’image [Écrits 92]), unlike the human 
infant, who remains in its thrall. Or rather, not captive according to Lacan’s 
dubious account of the animal psychologist Wolfgang Köhler, as Ziser has shown. 
For in his desire to assert the chimpanzee’s superiority over the human infant in 
matters of captation and the mirror, Lacan misrepresents Köhler, who detected 
rather more narcissistic tendencies in his subjects than Lacan claims (Ziser 17-
18). Based on this error, innocent or deliberate, it would appear that Lacan is far 
more interested in the incapacities of the human animal than non-human ones. 
Even within the same paragraph Derrida recognizes this much. In Lacan, ‘access 
to the symbolic’, which is deprived to the animal, is in fact access to … a lack. 
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Therefore, if the animal is lacking vis-à-vis the human in Lacanian discourse, 
what it is lacking is lack. (Derrida 130). Freud himself held this view, writing in a 
letter to Marie Bonaparte of his admiration, or envy, for his own dog, who could 
experience ‘affection without ambivalence, the simplicity of a life free from the 
almost unbearable conflicts of civilization, the beauty of an existence complete in 
itself’ (430).  Lacan does not escape by virtue of this nuance the well-worn 
philosophical tradition where Derrida locates him: to posit the animal as lacking 
lack, as possessing therefore an unmediated presence-to-itself, an organic 
intimacy, is hardly an advance either, if there can be such ‘advances’. 
 
Lacan, ethology and scientific discourse 
What then are we to make of Lacan’s later work, work from the period of the dog 
and the parakeet? Derrida is open about his neglect of Lacan’s work after 1966, 
saying that he will ‘have to leave in suspense the question of whether, in later 
texts (dans les textes qui ont suivi) or in certain seminars (published or 
unpublished, accessible or inaccessible) the armature of this logic came to be 
explicitly reexamined’ (132). Much of that unpublished work is now available, 
but Derrida surely alludes here to Encore, the seminar published twenty years 
before he was speaking. Not only does Encore contain the perplexing parakeet, a 
swarm of bees and a heavily punned upon rat, but also a thinly-veiled criticism of 
Derrida, or at least of Jean-Luc Nancy and Phillippe Lacoue-Labarthe, who are 
described there as sous-fifres (underlings) for their reading of Lacan’s ‘The 
Instance of the Letter’. Lacan calls Nancy and Lacoue-Labarthe’s short book ‘cet 
extraordinaire travail’ (62), with all the meaning that the word ‘work’ (travail) 
contains in psychoanalysis, referring to the unconscious mechanisms which 
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disguise desires (dream-work, joke-work). In this case the desire is the ‘dé-
supposition de mon savoir’ (64) (the de-supposition of my knowledge), with ‘dé-
supposition’ just one of many words beginning ‘dé’ with which Lacan peppers his 
discourse at this point in pointed allusion to Derrida (Lacan is wary of those who 
treat him as a ‘subject supposed to know’ as well).9  In any case, it is certainly 
worthwhile considering this seminar, since in it the animal appears no longer to 
perform the same function that it did in the earlier seminars I have cited from. 
 
What has changed?  Lacan more or less drops the theory of animality which 
explicitly guided him in the earlier seminars. It is a theory that Derrida mentions 
in his account of Lacan, but only to wonder twice why Lacan doesn’t draw on 
‘ethological knowledge’ (133, 135).  In response to Lacan’s blanket claim that the 
‘animal in general is incapable of pretending pretense’, Derrida wonders why 
Lacan ‘does not invoke here any ethological knowledge (whose increasing and 
spectacular refinement [raffinement croissant et spectaculaire] is proportional to 
the refinement of the animot) or any experience, observation, or personal 
attestation’ (133). Here Derrida seeks from Lacan any evidence (experience, 
observation, personal attestation) other than flat assertion, of which ethology is 
but one possibility. In other places in The Animal that Therefore I Am ‘ethological 
knowledge’ is invoked positively in its own right by Derrida: at one point he 
notes the ‘enormous progress that has been made in primatological and 
ethological knowledge in general (l’énorme progrès qu’on a fait dans le savoir 
primatologique et éthologique en general)’ (59). Instead of making 
undifferentiated claims about the animal, Derrida asks, why does not Lacan (and 
indeed Levinas, Heidegger) turn to the rich body of knowledge on the ‘infinite 
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diversity of animals’ which is ethology? (59) It was not yet available to him, but 
Derrida might have pointed, for example, to an instance in Lacan’s Seminar X, the 
one with the praying mantis. Just after Lacan notes cases of animals effacing their 
traces and laying false traces, and just before he says this does not constitute 
making signifiers, Lacan says to his seminar audience, ‘I don’t want to go into the 
infinite variety of what a developed zoology can teach you on this score.’ (63) So, 
on the one hand, Lacan recognizes the ‘infinite variety’ of creaturely life, and on 
the other, he symptomatically turns away from the science that might provide 
the evidence one way or the other. 
And yet, at other points in Seminar X Lacan discourses on, among others, 
hippopotami, a domestic dog, leeches, the black beetle, and echidna, sometimes, 
but not always, in relation to their difference from the human, but certainly not 
as homogeneous to each other in a single category of the ‘animal’. As Lacan’s 
intimacy with the hippopotamus and the echidna demonstrates, it is not the case 
that he never engaged seriously with the most ‘up-to-date’ ethological data 
available. Most strikingly, in the 1950s his theory of the imaginary drew heavily 
on Konrad Lorenz and Niko Tinbergen, two founding figures of ethology. These 
two, and ethology in general, are cited throughout the early seminars that I have 
been quoting from. For that matter, where does Lacan find the hen-pigeon of the 
mirror-stage which finds its own image so formative but in a then-recent essay 
by zoologist L. Henry Matthews? As Bruce Fink has convincingly shown, Lacan’s 
concepts of developmental processes, aggressivity and even love are all at least 
partially derived from his study of contemporary ethology (Lacan on Love 62-8). 
It is in fact zoological and ethological data that allows Lacan to refine the 
links between imaginary captation, in both animal and human, and aggression 
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towards the idealized image that is the inevitable precipitate of this captation. 
Indeed, the conceptualization of the imaginary in the early seminars is heavily 
dependent on ethological theories of animal aggression towards any ‘mirror’ 
image or ‘counterpart’. For instance, in Seminar III, when he comes to explain 
again why alienation is a necessary byproduct of the illusory mastery of 
imaginary relations, Lacan digresses into an extended discussion of the erotic 
and combative life of the male stickleback, a discussion taken directly from 
Lorenz’s King Solomon’s Ring (93-6). So, at least when it suits his arguments, 
Lacan is conversant with advanced ‘ethological knowledge’, even if in the later 
seminars it is precisely this scientific material on the animal that he gradually 
abandons. 
As for Derrida, it is difficult to know how to read the regular invocations 
of scientific knowledge of the animal he makes. This science is marked out by 
him as signs of progress, or at least as small advances, and yet in his own 
dealings with the animal with which he is most intimate, the domestic cat, he 
eschews any recourse to such forms of empirical knowledge. On the contrary, the 
encounter with the cat is marked by a radical non-knowledge of it on his part, an 
absolute openness to the questions that it poses for him certainly, an experience 
or witnessing of otherness, but an encounter that fails to extract a definite and 
positive knowledge of the other. As Matthew Calarco puts it, ‘In insisting on the 
unsubstitutable singularity of the cat (…) Derrida is contesting the possibility of 
fully reducing this particular cat to an object of knowledge, whether 
philosophical or otherwise’ (125). The explicit goal of ethology, on the other 
hand, is to increase and complicate our positive knowledge of animals in all their 
diversity and plurality. That Derrida in places endorses this activity but is 
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reluctant in his own experience or practice to follow this path may be an implicit 
admission that the zoologists, ethologists and primatologists cannot be so easily 
exempted from the conceptual subjugation of animality that Derrida finds in 
Lacan. 
Given ethology’s centrality to both Lacan’s understanding of the animal 
and to Derrida’s representation of Lacan, it is worthwhile giving it more 
attention. A key essay in this respect is Niko Tinbergen’s survey piece from 1969, 
‘Ethology’, which more or less coincides historically with the Lacanian seminars 
of the dog and the parakeet. In this piece Tinbergen outlines how ethology’s 
basic aim is to ‘contribute to our understanding of the normal, natural behaviour 
of animals under undisturbed conditions’ (131-2). This science of animal 
behaviour starts with Konrad Lorenz, but has an important antecedent in Darwin 
(130). The link with evolutionary science is made explicit in Lorenz’s influential 
early work, King Solomon’s Ring, where the main goal is to discover how 
behaviour patterns, especially aggression, contribute to survival. Tinbergen 
explains how the development of ethology saw its proponents in conflict with 
animal psychologists, who argued for the possibility of learning in animals while 
the ethologists gave greater emphasis to ‘innate’ behaviour. Indeed, the 
vocabulary of ethology as outlined by Tinbergen is very much of the sort 
regretted by Derrida in the early Lacan: animal activity is a form of ‘response’ to 
‘stimuli’ (Tinbergen 141) guided by ‘internal programming’ and ‘behaviour 
machinery’ (147).  In other words, if we hope to find a departure from the ‘old, 
old discourse’ of the Cartesian animal-machine, then we will not necessarily find 
it among the ethologists. 
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Another key distinction for Tinbergen is between observational and 
experimental ethology, with Lorenz opening the path to the latter but restricting 
himself to the former (137). Tinbergen in contrast may baulk at ‘interference 
with a child’s development’ for ‘ethical reasons’ (152), but is perfectly sanguine 
about the transplantation of pieces of a frog’s dorsal skin to its ventral side to 
determine whether the skin in the new spot will still generate the same reflex 
mechanism as if it were in the original location. (148-9) In other words, at least 
one branch of ethology participates in the regime of ‘regimentalization’, ‘genetic 
experimentation’, and ‘industrialization’ which Derrida establishes as the 
broader context for his philosophical enquiry. (Derrida 25) On the other hand, 
for those in animal studies seeking a mode of ‘living with animals’ differently 
(see Fudge 21), Lorenz’s King Solomon’s Ring provides a rather extraordinary 
model. Much to the dismay, as Lorenz admits, of the other human animals with 
whom he shared a dwelling, his house in Altenberg on the Danube was a place of 
full co-habitation with the furred and the feathered, and he himself traveled far 
down the path of becoming-goose (1-10). And yet, Lorenz gives no ground on 
that other major concession sought by many theorists of animality – that 
‘culture’ is not necessarily the exclusive domain of the so-called human.10 It 
would be difficult to find in Lacan such a confident and absolute division of 
animal and human as these words found in Lorenz’s On Aggression: ‘no means of 
communication, no learned rituals are ever handed down by tradition in animals.  
In other words, animals have no culture’ (57). 
It is precisely this ethological armature that Lacan gives up in the later 
seminars (the ones that Derrida does not include in his reading). In Encore, for 
example, Lacan has abandoned entirely the empirical support of the animal 
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scientists when he compares a parakeet to Descartes, puns on a swarm of bees 
(l’essaim sounds like S1 or the master signifier), and speaks of an equally punned-
upon rat not in terms of its so-called behaviour, but in terms of the desire of the 
scientist who has put it in the maze. What has changed in Lacan’s 
conceptualization of ‘the animal’, if indeed he still has a unified concept of it as 
such? Tentatively, we can identify two key differences between the Lacan of the 
early seminars and the later ones on the subject of the animal: a greater inter-
implication of symbolic-imaginary-real; and a growing suspicion of conventional 
scientific discourse and its claims.11 
When Lacan in the early to mid-50s argued that animals participate in the 
imaginary (and presumably also the real) but not in the symbolic, he implies that 
these realms are separable one from the other, that the imaginary exists 
independently from the symbolic. But this contradicts Lacan’s usual articulations 
of the tri-partite schema of R-S-I, where the three are inseparable and cannot 
ever be taken in isolation.12 Certainly in the later seminars such as Encore Lacan 
makes a great effort to find ways to capture this inter-implication, which can 
already be found in the ‘Mirror-Stage’ essay where imaginary relations are 
always already caught up in symbolic systems. The inextricability of real, 
imaginary and symbolic is perhaps most evident in Lacan’s late ambition for 
formalization, which led to the production of a number of graphs and mathemes, 
which are incomprehensible to any but the initiated and have become the subject 
of immense explicatory efforts. These efforts are normally oriented towards 
making the graphs meaningful, that is, to bringing them into the symbolic 
dimension. Indeed, the graphs are composed of symbols or ‘mathemes’, or what 
Lacan simply calls ‘letters’. But when they are arranged by Lacan on the page or 
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on the blackboard, these symbols which are not quite symbols also become not-
quite images: the four discourses, as has been noted, are composed of ‘quatre 
pattes’, and elsewhere he calls them ‘quatre godets’ (four pots) (D’un discours 
26); and the graph of sexuation in Encore looks remarkably like a bed. The fact 
that these graphs or arrangements of symbols are clearly neither purely images 
nor purely symbolic articulations suggests a certain unassimilable remainder, 
something that falls out or is not captured, or is impossible to imagine or 
symbolize – the real. As Douglas Sadao Aoki argues, this is why ‘Lacan 
conceptually distinguishes the letter from the signifier (…) and links the letter 
not with the symbolic, but rather with the real, with what must be excluded from 
symbolization’ (3)13 To treat the animal as caught up in imaginary relations, 
excluded from symbolization and (presumably) with privileged access to the 
real, is simply to primordialize the real as the realm of instinct and to sever the 
links of R-S-I which cannot in fact be shorn. 
The ideal of formalization also has a complicated relation to what Lacan 
calls, with increasing dismissiveness, the scientific discourse. It can be confusing 
to read Lacan on this subject, since his ongoing polemic against scientific 
knowledge, sometimes caught up in scornful references to the university 
discourse, is found side-by-side with a continued ambition that psychoanalysis 
should also be a science. At stake are different understandings of what a science 
might constitute and whether or not it accepts the challenge of the unconscious. 
Lacan is deeply skeptical of conventional scientific claims to establish 
‘knowledge’ as some discrete object free from language and a subject. As Bruce 
Fink has argued, science is a discourse which will not admit to its own 
discursivity, to its enlistment of a battery of signifiers; nor will it contemplate the 
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existence of a subject of science who is not independent of that discourse 
(Lacanian Subject 138-40). In contrast, the formalization of psychoanalytic 
knowledge in graphs and mathemes means that the transmission of this 
knowledge is not independent of its written supports, but indeed is constituted 
in and by those written supports. And where conventional science cannot 
accommodate the unconscious or its subject, the graphs, through their implicit 
failure to imagine or symbolize fully, do so. 
Since psychoanalysis is a science that works with the unconscious and its 
various effects, leaning on ethological knowledge which is based on empirical 
observation and experimentation becomes highly problematic. By the late 1960s, 
as Lacan explores more and more the possibilities of what he calls ‘lalangue’, the 
animal is no longer a confident reference, an empirical object about which there 
is certainty and knowledge. It is instead, or in addition, a word, a signifier. So, 
when he comes to talk at the end of Encore of a rat in a maze and what 
knowledge it might yield, he speaks very deliberately with the indefinite subject 
pronoun ‘on’, which Fink translates alternately as ‘they’ and ‘people’. It is not a 
question of what knowledge can be extracted from the rat in the maze, but of 
those who put it there wondering about the limits of their own knowledge, and 
hoping that they might be able to define it if they determine what ‘the knowledge 
of those who do not speak could be’ (139). Lacan therefore distances himself 
from the ethological experimental procedure and comments drily instead on 
what the ‘montage’ of the maze can tell us about the unconscious knowledge of 
the experimenter who constructed it, who built it on the basis of ‘lalangue’ (141). 
And not just any maze: in Lacan’s French this construct is a labyrinthe. He 
alternately calls it an ensemble, a montage, a composition, but he might very well 
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have called it what others call it – a myth – with the rat inside it every bit as 
hybrid as the Minotaur. 
And then at the very end of the seminar, in the last minutes of Encore, 
Lacan returns to the rat in order to talk about the relation between being and 
being, a relation, he says, which is not based on harmony. This absence of 
harmony is what necessitates love as a form of compensation. Or hate, which 
amounts to the same misrecognition. This is why ‘being (…) is only sustained by 
the fact of missing each other’ (145). That ‘missing each other’ which also 
suggests failure, is ‘se rater’ in French. And so it goes on: the rat can be 
considered a unity because it can undergo erasure (ça se rature); and a former 
concierge of Lacan’s had a hatred for rats so great that he never missed them (‘il 
ne le ratait jamais’) (Le séminaire: Encore 133).  Far from denying to the animal 
the privileges of being, Lacan grants them abundantly: it is subject to hatred (or 
love), it is a being which never truly coincides with itself, its being must be 
considered under erasure. How, then, is one to draw any conclusions about what 
‘the animal’ is for Lacan, when this rat is clearly not a rat, or at least not just a rat, 
but a pretext for clowning, for the enjoyment of word-play, for the small measure 
of jouissance offered by la bétise?  
 
La bétise, so instrumental in the clinic and in Lacan’s teaching, is there from the 
start, but intensifies in the later seminars. The animal, meanwhile, fixed in its 
coding in the early seminars, so as to be passed over by Lacan, becomes in the 
later seminars a reason to pause.  The dog and the parakeet are not known in 
advance, but rather puzzles or puns.  Their desire is as much a riddle as the 
desire of the human animal, and there is no question of bringing ethological 
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knowledge to bear on them.  In Encore, the maze the experimenter lays out for 
the rat – its tests, its punishments, its rewards – does not yield up data about the 
rat’s reaction and response, but about the knowledge and desire of the 
experimenter.  At the same time, at the very end of this seminar Lacan offers a 
tantalizing metaphor for the human animal, in his enigmatic pun on l’essaim (the 
swarm), which is homophonic with S1, the master signifier (Le séminaire: Encore, 
130).  Justin Clemens has traced the roots of this ‘puncept’ to Kant’s 
Schwärmerei, and suggests that for the Lacan of this epoch, ‘man is a swarm 
animal’ (143-66). From denying bees language in 1953, then, Lacan is inspired 
by the buzzing and winged to punceptualise the human in 1973. 
As for the bees themselves, they also return in Encore, but now without 
reference to von Frisch. No longer is it a question of whether bees possess 
language, or whether their ‘waggle dance’ is a form of speech. Instead, it has 
become a question of reading. We ‘read’ in the flights of bees the reproduction of 
plants, and in the flight of the swallow the coming storm. But, asks Lacan, does 
the bee read these things, does the swallow? The question, he says, is an open 
one (Le séminaire: Encore 38). 
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1 For example, in the special issue of Angelaki devoted to the ‘Limits of the 
human’ there is a single reference to an essay of Lacan’s from 1953 (Roelvink 
and Zolkos 49); and in the entire Angelaki special issue ‘We have never been 
human from techne to animality’, there is a single reference to Lacan’s ‘Mirror 
Stage’ (Stiegler 164). In contrast, the issues contain many references to 
Heidegger and Žižek, making Lacan the absent middle of a sandwich of precursor 
and inheritor. A special issue of Yale French Studies in 2015, ‘Animots: 
Postanimality in French Thought’, contains only three passing references to 
Lacan (Senior, Clark and Freccero 7, 58, 160); and Animals … in Theory, a special 
issue of The New Centennial Review (Clark), contains one astute paragraph on 
Lacan’s Seminar XI (Sliwinski, 73). 
2 For another example of a text that approaches lacanimals only by way of 
Derrida see Still 119-20 & 127-28.  
3 Thank you to Marie-Dominique Garnier for spotting the cat for me. 
4 On the ‘transmission’ of Lacanian knowledge, especially through mathemes, see 
Fink The Lacanian Subject 144. 
5 As Douglas Sadao Aoki has shown, there is also no shortage of readers of Lacan 
who are highly allergic to his mathemes. ‘Letters from Lacan’ 2-7.  As Aoki 
brilliantly demonstrates, the Lacanian letter or matheme is ‘the very condition of 
reading, and yet (…) is impervious to being read.’ (3) This challenge of reading 
Lacan’s letters has been taken up quite strikingly in relation to the four 
discourses, particularly in Clemens and Grigg. 
6 It is also the translation that Bernard Stiegler relies on in his discussion of the 
term’s use by both Deleuze and Derrida. Stiegler makes no reference to its 
prominent place in Lacanian psychoanalysis. 
7 Thank you to the anonymous reader who pointed me towards this literature. 
Derrida’s remarks on Lacan and von Frisch can also be found in The Beast and 
the Sovereign (115-120). 
8 One theorist of animality goes so far as to see direct affinities between Derrida’s 
reflections on his little cat, and Lacan’s account of the gaze in The Four 
Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis (Sliwinski 73). 
9 Maria Scott has recently noted the importance of Nancy and Lacoue-Labarthe 
‘de-supposing’ Lacan’s knowledge in ‘Lacan’s “Of the Gaze as Objet Petit a”’ 338. 
10 See, for example, de Waal. 
11 Dylan Evans has also noted Lacan’s abandonment of his early subscription to 
ethology.  Evans, a Darwinian committed to neuro-science, thinks that this is 
where Lacan went wrong.  Evans 47-51. 
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12 I am indebted to Rob Lapsley for pointing out to me this inconsistency in 
Lacan’s model when he discusses animals in the early seminars. 
13 While Aoki insists on the matheme or letter as a kernel of the ‘real’, he later 
notes that it contains both the lure of the image and the system of differentiation 
of the symbolic: ‘it is exactly the image of the matheme that lures such critics into 
concomitantly misrecognizing it as formalization and overlooking its 
paradigmatically symbolic difference and slippage’ (4). 
